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Abstract 
The received view holds that to judge something or someone as sentimental is to 
condemn. This account holds that an emotion is sentimental where it is excessive, 
misjudges its object and involves savouring a positive self-image. This paper presents 
two different challenges to the received view. First, the positive idealizations of 
sentimentality are no worse than other cognitive biases pervasive in our ordinary 
mental life. Moreover, where, as is often the case, sentimentality is good for our well-
being, sentimentality looks broadly rational. Second, and more radically, 
sentimentality is not always to be evaluated in epistemic terms. Rather, 
sentimentality, often at least, is a matter of reminding us of or re-orientating our non-
cognitive affective attachments. Sentimental works can renew or revolutionize our 
affective attachments for the good, whether that be towards love, family, causes, or 
the oppressed. Hence, in both art and life, sentimentality is sometimes a very good 
thing. 
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I: Introduction  
It may seem to be a truth almost universally acknowledged that sentimentality in 
attitude or expression is in want of some justification. In artistic criticism (especially 
with the advent of modernism) to accuse a work of sentimentality is usually to 
condemn it. Hence ÔsentimentalityÕ is typically used as a form of critical abuse. 
Indeed it is not uncommon to find critics praising works for avoiding sentimentality 
especially with respect to love, relationships, characters or even the world more 
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generally. Ezra Pound, for example, characterized the avoidance of sentimentality as 
part of the literary merit of JoyceÕs Dubliners: 
 
Mr. JoyceÕs merit, I will not say his chief merit but his most engaging merit, is that he 
carefully avoids telling you a lot that you donÕt want to know. He presents his people 
swiftly and vividly, he does not sentimentalise over them, he does not weave 
convolutions.  He is a realist. He does not believe ÒlifeÓ would be all right if we 
stopped vivisection or if we instituted a new sort of Òeconomics.Ó He gives the thing 
as it is. (Pound 1914: 267) 
 
PoundÕs attitude was typical of modernists anxious to clear away Victorian 
sentimentalism in order to make art new and vital once more. For all their differences, 
Wyndham Lewis, Virginia Woolf, D. H. Lawrence and T. S. Eliot all abhorred 
sentimentality. This attitude is not peculiar to early twentieth century modernism. In 
contemporary critical circles we find that the term is used just as pejoratively. A 
contemporary edition of DickensÕs Hard Times, for example, states that Ôeven some 
of DickensÕs most devoted fans admit that he is often sentimentalÕ (2004: 326) as if 
even the most blindly partial cannot but allow the fault (along with the frequency of 
its occurrence). 
 As in art, so too in life. To accuse someone of sentimentality is usually taken 
to ascribe a fault or vice. Thus, famously, Oscar Wilde condemned Lord Alfred 
Douglas (Bosey): Ôthe fact is that you were, and are I suppose still, a typical 
sentimentalist. For a sentamentalist is simply one who desires to have the luxury of an 
emotion without paying for it. You think that one can have oneÕs emotions for 
nothing. One cannot.Õ (Tanner 1976Ð77: 127). 
 To be guilty of sentimentality, it is assumed, is to be guilty of some kind of 
failing in attitude or character. Hence sentimentality is often identified in social 
comment as explaining failures in judgement or action. Thus we get newspaper 
headlines such as ÔHow to End the Housing Crisis: Forget Sentimentality and Build 
on the Green BeltÕ, from The Independent on Sunday (Birrell 2015), or ÔWhy the 
Death of Sentimentality in Journalism is a Good ThingÕ from The Washington Post 
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(Cillizza 2015) or cultural comment pieces on how ÔSentimental Myths Harm Our 
HistoryÕ in the Times Educational Supplement (Brighouse 2005). Sentimentality, it is 
standardly assumed, is a concept part of the content of which brings with it an 
inherently negative evaluation and the term can be applied to art works, agents, 
practices and institutions. 
 The thought that sentimentality is a bad thing is only almost universally 
acknowledged since there are significant dissenters. Within literary studies there has 
been a body of work devoted towards putting sentiment, sentimental literature and 
sentimentality in a much more positive light (prominent examples include Cohen 
1999; Festa 2006; Shields 2010). There have also been one or two figures in the 
philosophical literature similarly inclined (Solomon 2004; Newman 2008). 
Nonetheless the standard view, as manifest in much folk judgement, critical practice 
and philosophical argument, seems to be that sentimentality is something to be 
condemned. However, as we shall see, if we examine the literary and philosophical 
accounts of the standard view a puzzle arises. There are many works or attitudes that 
seem to fit the standard characterization taken to explain why sentimentality is bad 
and yet which we (or at least many of us) are inclined to think good. Jane AustenÕs 
Pride and Prejudice is subtitled ÔA Sentimental ComedyÕ as her entire oeuvre might 
be and Frank CapraÕs or Charlie ChapinÕs films are highly sentimental. These are not 
bizarre outliers. Much religious art, political art, many romantic comedies (perhaps 
the genre itself), coming of age stories, domestic narratives and studies in self 
discovery would seem to fall under the received viewÕs characterization of 
sentimentality. We would judge many works in these categories to be good partly in 
virtue of rather than despite their apparent sentimentality. 
In what follows I will outline the received viewÕs condemnation of 
sentimentality. I will then go on to explore various options as to how we may allow 
for good sentimental art within the terms set by the received view. Ultimately, 
however, it will be suggested that the fundamental problem with the received view is 
the presumption of a certain kind of cognitivist account of emotion which underwrites 
the (mis)identification of sentimentality as necessarily being in error. 
I will argue that sentimentality is sometimes a matter of expressing, 
reinforcing or (re)aligning non-cognitive elements within our attitudes and emotions. 
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Hence, properly understood, either a) a certain kind of sentimentality is not always 
bad and sometimes a good making feature or b) what is often identified, falsely, as 
sentimentality by the received view (due to a category mistake), is no such thing. 
Indeed, it will be argued that sentimentality or what is often identified as such on the 
received view plays a significant and positive role in our lives generally and in much 
art in particular. 
The theme and line of thought argued for is partly inspired by Peter Goldie in 
a number of respects. It is difficult to see how sentimentality could be anything other 
than bad on standard cognitivist views of the emotions. Yet PeterÕs work on the 
emotions, through emphasizing the roles both thought and feeling play, makes 
conceptual space within which we can see how sentimentality, at least sometimes, can 
be a good thing. PeterÕs account of the emotions (Goldie 2000) Ð along with that of 
others Ð sought to emphasis the nature of emotion according to which the conative 
and affective elements play as large a part as the more commonly focused upon 
cognitive element. Hence PeterÕs notion of Ôfeeling towardÕ the emotional object 
(Goldie 2002) which seems better suited to capturing the richness of our 
psychological economy, including wishes, hopes and affective orientations, than more 
traditional cognitivist accounts. Paying careful attention to the messy complexity and 
variety of our mental life was a great theme of PeterÕs work until the very last. One of 
the points Peter developed was the idea that we have natural tendencies to fictionalize 
our autobiographies (Goldie 2012). This is often a bad thing and may sometimes be 
corrected for. Yet there is also a strain of thought to be found in PeterÕs work that, 
despite everything, this can sometimes be a good thing. The stories we imagine about 
our future selves, which may fictionalize our self-image, can renew our moral 
resilience or commitments (Goldie 2012: 168Ð70). This seems consonant with the 
argument put forward later that the value of sentimentality is a contextual matter i.e. 
in some cases sentimentality may be a failing, yet in other cases a virtue. In particular 
I suggest that where our affections or attitude of care is strengthened or, in rarer cases, 
reorientated for the better, then sentimentality is a good thing. Hence what follows is 
also of a piece with a belief in the educative power of art. Much of PeterÕs 
philosophical methodology, and some of his argument, is predicated on the 
assumption that good art can educate. What follows might be thought of as a take on a 
neglected way in which this might be so, one which stands in contrast to the overly 
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narrow focus on gaining knowledge that is the preoccupation of much of the 
contemporary debate. Peter was an engaging, complex, considerate friend: dry one 
moment, sentimental (in a good sense) the next. I would like to think that this piece 
and the sentiment behind the volume might have provoked both responses in him. He 
is missed. 
 
II: The Standard Condemnation of Sentimentality 
What follows in this section is a laying out of the philosophical case for the received 
view (which the rest of the paper will then go on to question). In doing so it chimes 
with work by others such as Knight (1999: 412Ð414), Choi (2008) and Robinson 
(2012) who lay out the standard view in similar terms. 
 Excess feeling, as identified by WilkieÕs (1967) survey of dictionary and 
literary handbooks, is the most commonly identified feature of sentimentality. The 
following characterization is typical: 
 
ÔSentimentality may show itself as pure gushiness or as a kind of hair-trigger 
emotional sensitiveness. But whatever form it takes, sentimentality always involves 
an implied demand on the part of the writer for more emotional response than the 
situation warrants; and it implies, on the part of the sentimental reader, a willingness 
to respond emotionally when the response is not actually justified.Õ (Brooks and 
Warren 1958: 373). 
 
 The characterization is given in terms of responses to literary representations 
but, as noted earlier, there is a wide range of attitudes, actions, personal dispositions, 
practices and representations that may be deemed sentimental. Moreover, we should 
bear in mind that there can be sentimental representations of non-sentimental 
attitudes, people or situations and, conversely, sentimental representations of non-
sentimental attitudes or actions. Hence a representation of war may be deeply 
sentimental, as Orwell (2001) accused AudenÕs poem Spain of being, whilst a 
representation of romantic love, such as that to be found in David Foster WallaceÕs 
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Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (1999), might not be. For present purposes we will 
assume we are concerned with the sentimentality of dispositional traits or states as 
manifested or where something is appropriately classified as a member of a form or 
class of objects whose authorized purpose is to express or solicit, with commendation, 
certain responses from us. 
 It is also worth emphasizing that the putative excess of sentimentality here is 
not to be equated with extremity of feeling. Love and bereavement, for example, often 
involve extremes of feeling and passion. Presumably the condemnation of 
sentimentality is not supposed to preclude extremes of feeling at the death of a child, 
lover or parent. Catastrophes, betrayals, deaths, accidents, crimes, tragedies, super 
human achievements, triumphs of love and more may all legitimate overwhelming 
feeling. Furthermore, much that is sentimental hardly concerns extremes of feeling at 
all. The sentimentality of domesticity or the past, for example, is often taken up with 
comparatively subdued feelings expressed in a more minor key. Nostalgic recall of a 
favourite caf may manifest a kind of wistful sentimentality and yet not be 
particularly intense or extreme. Excess or disproportion of feeling is not to be equated 
with extremity of feeling. Thus we need to ask in virtue of what it is that something 
constitutes an excess? 
 Let us assume that emotions and higher order cognitive-affective attitudes are 
warranted or appropriate to the extent that a) the object, person or situation responded 
to has the relevantly ascribed feature(s), b) there is a relationship of (rational) fit 
between the nature of the response and the eliciting object or situation and c) the 
depth and intensity of the response or attitude is proportional. In general then feelings 
and cognitive-affective attitudes can deviate from what is appropriate or warranted in 
terms of the intensity, depth, kind of response or misascription of features of the 
object or situation it is predicated upon. Anger can be misdirected at someone, disgust 
overly sensitive, pining for someone overly obsessive or sadness at something can 
itself be too faint or extreme. Sentimentality, then, often seems to involve the 
indulgence of unwarranted emotions and attitudes. Yet in order to manifest 
sentimentality an emotional state, attitude or action must be inappropriate or 
unwarranted in a particular kind of way. 
	 7	
 Sentimentality, minimally at least, seems to involve the cognitive error of 
distorting or misrepresenting the objects of cognitive-affective attitudes by idealizing 
them in order to indulge or gratify our desires. Idealization here just amounts to over-
estimating desirable features in some respect and underestimating desirable ones (or 
at least the limitations of such): 
 
ÔA sentimental mode of thought is typically one that idealizes its object under the 
guidance of a desire for gratification and reassurance. Derivatively, emotion is 
sentimental which is supported by such as thought. And we can see that such an 
attitude is one that may be directed not only towards other people and abstract causes 
[. . .] but also towards the self and, at the other extreme, towards the inanimate natural 
worldÕ (Savile 2008: 340). 
 
 SavileÕs characterization is rather broad. We might think that someone 
overestimating how quickly she can complete a crossword to gratify her self-image or 
idealizing the attractiveness of a partner to reassure her vanity would not as such 
count as sentimental. Thus Savile seems to have identified a broad psychological 
genus of which sentimentality is only one particular species where the Ôemphasis is 
upon such things as the sweetness, dearness, littleness, blamelessness, and 
vulnerability of the emotionsÕ objects. The qualities that sentimentality imposes on its 
objects are the qualities of innocence. But this almost always involves a gross 
simplification of the nature of the objectÕ (Jefferson 1983: 526Ð7). It does not matter 
whether sentimentality proper is to be identified with the genus Savile characterizes 
or, as Jefferson argues, the species of the genus that inherits the same fundamental 
problem with respect to themes such as innocence. What matters according to the 
received view is the fundamentally erroneous nature of sentimentality as identified. 
SentimentalityÕs errors are held to be intrinsically bad in virtue of abrogating the 
epistemic norms of judgement or belief. The idealizations involved constitute a 
motivated systematic, culpable inattention to and distortion of evidence, reasons or 
routes to belief and judgement about the object(s) concerned. 
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 Consider sentimentality about children. Dwelling on childish obedience, 
optimism, exuberance, charm and naivety at the expense of recognizing more 
animalistic drives may lead to apprehending them under the light of various 
evaluative concepts ranging from the cute, beautiful and innocent to the passive. The 
cognitive-affective apprehension of children in such a manner may enable indulgence 
in the warm glow of feelings at the ruby cheeked innocence of the young. However, 
where doing so involves ignoring or willfully averting attention from the less savoury 
aspects of the character of children it is to commit an epistemic error. A sentimental 
indulgence in such feelings remains blind to the darker aspects of child psychology, 
whereas a clear-sighted recognition of good childrenÕs behaviour does not. Hence the 
latter takes goodness to be an achievement whereas the former assumes all children to 
be naturally innocent and good. 
 The fundamental epistemic fault can itself become an artistic or moral one 
under certain conditions. In the aesthetic case consider many works by the American 
artist and illustrator Norman Rockwell. Extremely popular for most of his life, 
Rockwell specialized in sentimental portraits of ordinary folk, families, kids and 
scruffy pets. In Happy Birthday Miss Jones (1956), now owned by Steven Spielberg, 
we have a female teacher of a certain age facing toward her seated schoolchildren 
(and thus the viewer). Behind Miss Jones, spelt (and misspelt) out on the blackboard 
are scrawled messages of ÔsurpriseÕ and ÔHappy BirthdayÕ written by the ramshackle 
kids keenly sitting up and looking towards her. The sentiment of warm delight on her 
face is one the viewer is prescribed to share. Technically the painting is accomplished 
with a strong pictorial design. The horizontal rows of seated children stand in sharp 
contrast to the mid vertical lines of the blackboard, which enhances the sense of 
pictorial depth. The teacher looks down upon her charges, and a sense of stillness is 
enhanced by the chalk and duster scattered unnoticed at her feet, which serves to 
indicate the previous momentÕs scurry as the scattered children rushed to their places. 
Yet for all the paintingÕs technical skill its artistic value is fairly low. The visual 
interest is in the service of warm sentiments cheaply won since far from clarifying our 
thoughts or emotional responses in any cognitively illuminating way the picture 
merely holds up to us pleasingly false platitudes about childish innocence. If we 
assume that cognitive values can be internal to a workÕs value as art (Gaut 2009; 
Kieran 2005) or in so far as the prescribed responses sought from us are relevant to 
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workÕs value as art (Carroll 1996; Gaut 2009), the epistemic flaw thereby constitutes 
or contributes to an artistic flaw. For in so far as we should not think of children as all 
sweetness and light, the kind of sentimentality the Rockwell painting solicits from us 
is thereby unwarranted. 
 The moral case, at least in certain cases, is more pernicious. At the individual 
level parentsÕ sentimentality about children may lead to them explaining away faults 
or indulging childrenÕs immediate desires in ways that turn out to be developmentally 
harmful. At a societal level, if public policy with respect to the justice system, social 
services and child care, for example, is predicated on a sentimentalized presumption 
of childhood innocence and goodness then it is not only unlikely to achieve its aims 
but may turn out to be positively destructive (Dalrymple 2010). 
 The intrinsic epistemic error sentimentality is charged with putatively explains 
a further charge, namely the claim that sentimentality renders people unable to deal 
with or navigate the world (Midgley 1979: 385). In setting up distorting expectations 
of innocence, goodness, passivity or presumptions that love will triumph over all else, 
sentimentality embeds unrealistic expectations concerning the ease with which our 
desires may be fulfilled, how benign the world is and how good people are. Those 
prey to sentimentality are set up for a particular kind of fall where the world 
continually seems to fail them. Hence the sentimental person may tend to range from 
gullibility to incomprehension at how and why people are often motivated as they in 
fact are. 
 Finally, the gratification of desire that drives sentimentality is often taken to 
concern the desire for and pleasure at the savouring of a positive self-image. The idea 
being that sentimentality involves a meta-response of delight at the goodness of the 
self-image afforded by the recognition of the warm and tender first order feelings as 
directed toward their objects (Savile 2010; Kupfer 1996). 
 In light of the above, the strongest case to be made for the standard 
condemnation of sentimentality is that it is a flaw in virtue of its i) indulgence of 
inappropriately excessive emotion ii) issuing from, leading to or partly constituted by 
a cognitive error of belief or judgement in idealization in order to satisfy desire iii) 
which involves an element of self-direction in being for the sake of or giving rise to a 
meta-response of pleasure at or approval of a subjectÕs self image and which, given i) 
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Ð iii), thereby constitutes a flaw in the work as art or the agentÕs attitude, action or 
character. 
 
III: Assessing the Received View 
It is not enough to argue for sentimentality against the received view on the grounds 
that there is a descriptive sense according to which what is picked out just are the 
tender emotions (Solomon 2004) or certain literary genres and styles (Newman 2008). 
As has been pointed out (Knight 1999; Higgins 2009; Robinson 2012), such a defense 
may get us to see that openness to the tender emotions is often falsely dismissed as 
sentimentality in the stronger sense but this does not constitute a defense of it. What 
this section thus aims to do is challenge distinct elements of the received view as 
articulated above. It then proceeds to explore two different types of move that grant to 
the standard account that sentimentality always involves epistemic error and yet, 
nonetheless, tries to suggest how and why it may sometimes be a good thing. 
 It is hard to see why we should condemn sentimentality just because it 
involves self-directed feelings of pleasure or admiration as a meta-response to our 
first order feelings or self-image. Possessing many positively valued cognitive-
affective attitudes is compatible with self-directed attitudes of approval or delight 
arising as a result of them. Perhaps it is supposed to be the fact that in sentimentality 
the first order responses are putatively sought out in order to give rise to the meta-
response that renders it problematic. Yet why think this? We often find that complex 
self-directed meta-responses are innocent enough. Tragedy, it is sometimes claimed, 
enables a complexity of meta-response which goes some way to underwriting its high 
positive value (Feagin 1983). More pertinently consider a mother who conjures up 
sentimental memories of her daughter. She does so to indulge feelings of delight at 
the pleasure derived from her childÕs responses to her and how she turned out to be a 
better mother than feared. There seems to be nothing intrinsically wrong with 
indulging such feelings per se and the meta-response of pleasure at her self-directed 
relief and self-image seem entirely appropriate. More fundamentally it is unclear why 
we should consider sentimentality to be essentially self-involving. No doubt taking 
pleasure at feeling warmly toward the kinds of people, stories and relations that 
matter to us sometimes does give rise to feelings of being pleased with ourselves. Yet 
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sentimentality need not involve self-directed meta-responses. In ChaplinÕs City Lights 
the audienceÕs hopes as to whether the blind flower girl will love the tramp on 
regaining her sight is symptomatic of romantic sentimentality. From love at first sight 
the tramp is prepared to do pretty much anything for the flower girl including paying 
to restore her sight and thereby risk losing her. We are prescribed to delight in the 
lengths the tramp is prepared to go to for love and hope that, if restored, the girlÕs 
sight wonÕt reveal her love to have been illusory. Yet such hopes and fears appear to 
be sentimental independently of whether or not we happen to respond with delight at 
the contemplation of the successfully solicited first order feelings. Sentimentality 
need not be inherently self-regarding and even where it is this is not in and of itself 
automatically a bad thing. 
 What then of the charge that sentimentality involves being prey to unrealistic 
expectations, for example concerning relationships or children, thereby rendering 
someone less able to navigate the world successfully due to the kind of epistemic 
error in idealization involved. How credible is this charge? 
 The first point to make is that if the charge rests on the idea that sentimentality 
falsely biases us toward an optimistic world view (with respect to matters such as love 
or relationships) then it is far from obvious that doing so is either specific to 
sentimentality or that being so biased harms us. Indeed, there is good reason to think 
that sentimentality as a kind of positive false bias is beneficial. We are subject to all 
sorts of positive biasing distortions which far from harming us often help us to 
navigate the world successfully and flourish. 
 People are standardly overly optimistic about, amongst other things, what they 
can do, how well they can do it, the control they can exercise in doing it, how creative 
they are, how nice they are, how attractive they are, how important they are to others, 
how good their kids are and how good their relationships are. Taylor and Brown 
(1988) is the classic source for the identification of positive illusion bias as pervasive 
in ordinary thought and Elga (2005: 5Ð6) gives an engaging characterization of why 
this really is evidence for positive self-overrating. In the last thirty years or so there 
has been an exponential growth in research devoted to exploring the reliability with 
which normal people have false positive biases, the many different kinds of positive 
biases there are and their beneficial effects including, for example, illusions of control 
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(Davis, Sundahl and Lesbo 2000), judging the self to be above average (Alicke, Klotz, 
Breitenbecher, Yurak and Vredenburg, 1995; Wenger and Fowers 2008) and overly 
optimistic personal predictions (Sweeny, Carroll and Shepperd, 2006; Krizan and 
Windschitl, 2007). 
 In one study (Buunk 2001), 141 Dutch undergraduates were asked to complete 
a relational interaction satisfaction scale questionnaire. Subjects were presented with 
statements such as ÔI feel happy when IÕm with my partnerÕ and ÔWe have quarrelsÕ 
and asked to rate how much they agreed with each statement on a Likert scale to 
assess relationship satisfaction. They were then asked to estimate, respectively, the 
percentage of students in a close relationship who were happy and unhappy with their 
relationship. Finally subjects were asked to compare the state of their relationship 
with that of most other students (rating from 1 = much worse to 5 = much better). 
Most subjects assumed the majority of people to be happy in their relationships and 
perceived their relationship on average as better than that of others. The greater the 
relationship satisfaction the greater the assumption of perceived superiority, 
suggesting that the more satisfied an individual is with his or her close relationship 
the greater the illusion of superiority. 
  Crucially the positive illusions we are subject to often seem to be positively 
beneficial. Self-serving positive attributions influence positive moods and enhance 
feelings of happiness, facilitate social bonding and practical functioning, making it 
more likely that one will help others, produce more creative work and persevere with 
difficult tasks or goals (Taylor and Brown, 1988). This seems fairly obvious. 
Optimistic folk with high self-evaluations are more likely to commence new projects 
or take on problems and in so doing achieve more. The self-assured and confident are 
more likely to find equable partners and friends. Those with positive self-conceptions 
are likely to feel good about themselves and indeed life more generally. More 
surprisingly there is psychological research which suggests that unrealistic optimistic 
beliefs may not only enable people to adapt to stressful situations or events but might 
be protective of physical health (Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, Grunewald, 2000). 
 It is also worth noting the converse psychological phenomenon of depressive 
realism. Whilst evidence for this is more controversial, meta-analyses suggest there is 
some good reason to hold that subjects who are clinically depressed are systematically 
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more accurate with respect to matters such as judging their control over events 
(Ackerman and DuRubeis 1991; Moore and Fresco 2012) and, even more especially, 
their superiority or relative importance when compared with others (Zai-ting and 
Shen-ing 2007). In contrast with normal subjects, who systematically distort the world 
in positive ways that promote their happiness and ability to function, depression 
seems to strip away positive illusions and attempts to rectify residual distortions in the 
clinically depressed may be more harmful than beneficial (Ghaemi 2007; Stone 
Dodrill and Johnson 2001).  
 In general then there are many cases where, far from undermining our ability 
to function in the world, positive illusion biases enable us to flourish. In so far as the 
charge against sentimentality involves the claim that the idealizations involved are 
bound up with overly optimistic attitudes or assessments, and thus in cognitive error, 
it is certainly no worse than many other positive illusion biases that help us to get 
through life. Moreover, with respect to sentimentality in particular, perhaps we should 
be particularly grateful that we are subject to positive illusion biases regarding 
romantic relationships, bringing up children and other such tender hearted matters. 
Sentimentality may thus enable us to seek out or persevere with relationships of the 
heart in ways we might otherwise find more difficult (or may not). This type of move 
against the standard view holds that sentimentality, even though in cognitive error, 
nonetheless helps us to realize important human goods. Hence, on this view, in many 
cases sentimentality turns out to be both rational and a good thing. 
 Yet defenders of the received view can just hold there ground. No matter how 
much sentimentality promotes well-being the charge remains that strictly speaking 
sentimentality involves epistemic error. Beneficial side effects notwithstanding, 
sentimentality still involves inappropriate or unwarranted cognitive-affective 
attitudes. Beliefs aim at truth via justification. In so far as sentimentality engenders 
beliefs that pull away from what we are justified in believing toward what we desire, 
it thereby abrogates basic epistemic norms or duties. Thinking of your romantic 
relationship as more special than most may well be good for you or the relationship 
but it does not thereby make the belief somehow more justified or true. 
One option is to distinguish, sharply, sentimentality in life from sentimentality 
in art and argue that whilst the former is to be condemned, the latter may be blameless 
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or a moderately good making feature. Robinson (2012) richly develops a version of 
this strategy, arguing that even though sentimentality in life is to be condemned the 
harmless pleasures of sentimental works can be valuable. Sentimental works may not 
constitute the highest or greatest of art works, given they can hardly aim at genuine 
insight or profundity. Nonetheless such works can be of some value as art in 
successfully soliciting certain sweet, idealizing emotions or attitudes. From the 
associations of popular songs to the pleasures of films such as Love Actually, people 
often enjoy the expression of sentiment even if cheaply won. Choi (2008), in a rather 
different vein, grants that sentimentality in life is to be condemned, but argues that 
artistic sentimentality can sometimes be a good thing in works as art. Her informative 
discussion of work by Lars von Trier, amongst others, suggests that even highly 
reflexive, avant-garde art, can make use of sentimentality for the purposes of aesthetic 
experimentation and, at least in knowing audiences, prompt moral reflection (Choi 
2008). 
 A second option is to argue that whilst it may be true enough to say that 
sentimentality is strictly speaking in epistemic error, there is more to rationality than 
the standard view allows. We can ask, in broad terms, whether or not something is 
practically or prudentially rational in helping us to realize our aims. It may strictly 
speaking be epistemically imperfect to be sentimental about oneÕs close romantic 
relationship in considering it superior to others and yet rational in a broader practical 
sense to do so. The thought can be cashed out by arguing that narrowly epistemic 
reasons for believing are only one kind of reason that go into the mix. Narrowly 
epistemic reasons can clash with and be overridden by other kinds of reason such as 
the desire to believe or agential ends favouring somethingÕs being believed. 
 The problem with this line of thought, at least from the first person 
perspective, is that it is difficult to see how the judgements or beliefs involved could 
be assented to on non-epistemic grounds. To assent to a proposition as a belief is to 
take it to be true. Hence epistemic reasons to believe seem to be constitutively 
normative rather than contingently or contextually so. This is not to say that such an 
argument cannot be made. There are various arguments put forward for doxastic 
voluntarism (Montmarquet 2008) or according to which we can will to believe 
propositions under circumstances of ambiguity and underdetermination (Ginet 2001). 
Nonetheless the putative fact that believing oneÕs relationship is superior makes for a 
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better, happier relationship, does not in and of itself give evidence for or epistemic 
reason to believe it. Indeed, presumably once we are aware of the fact that the falsely 
positive overestimations implicit in our sentimental attitudes are endemic, we ought to 
take that as reason to revise, fairly radically and systematically, our estimations in a 
much more parsimonious fashion. 
 Yet even given the recognition that this is so, it seems difficult, at least from 
the first person point of view, to apprehend our sentimental attachments so clear 
sightedly. This is certainly not true for many beliefs. If I have reason to believe that 
my heuristics for estimating distance are systematically biased then it seems like it 
would be easy enough to adjust them accordingly by doing the appropriate 
calculations or building in correctives (if I need to). Yet when inter-acting with my 
romantic partner, at least when things are going well, my estimation of how special 
our relationship is and the kind of reasons adduced often seem impervious to the 
recognition that there is good reason to suppose that this involves systematically over-
estimating desirable features in some respects and underestimating undesirable ones.  
 Now according to Nagel (1986) there is a deep contrast between an internal 
viewpoint upon the world, where we are acting from and perceiving the world framed 
by our subjective desires, interests and concerns, and an external viewpoint upon the 
world, the most extreme version of which is taking up the objective stance towards 
oneÕs interests and desires as just those belonging to one individual amongst many. 
Independently of controversies over whether the most objective viewpoint, 
independently of any particularity of time, place or interest, is achievable or not, we 
can all recognize that there is a continuum from being fully possessed by and seeing 
the world from oneÕs particular viewpoint in the grip of present desires, and taking up 
a more objective viewpoint where one is capable of reflecting from a more impartial 
point of view upon such. As Elga (2005) has argued, perhaps we should just 
distinguish between non-reflective self-overrating and a more reflective perspective in 
light of which we can correct for and recalibrate (downwards) our non-reflective 
ratings. Applying this to sentimentality then, the capacity to take up a more objective 
or reflective stance, on this view, enables us to achieve a more realistic perspective 
upon those things that we are sentimental about. Thus whilst we might not be able to 
escape sentimentality from the most subjective, nonreflective viewpoint, especially 
when taken up with expressions of love and desire in the moment, the epistemically 
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virtuous will be more clear sighted about their sentimental overatings from an 
objective or reflective point of view (Elga 2005). 
 If something like this is on the right lines then, according to this line of 
thought, there is a more nuanced account available. Bad sentimentalists are people 
who recognize that there is reason to think we idealize what we are sentimental about 
and yet even from the objective point of view tend to claim that their romantic 
relationships, children, familial attachments and so on really are more special than 
and superior to others. The good sentimentalist is one who, when proceeding from the 
subjective point of view, will tend to be sentimental about their romantic partners, 
children and relationships. This can be, as we saw above, a very good thing. 
Nonetheless, when considering matters from a more objective point of view he or she 
will be sensitive to the reasons and evidence that suggest his or her evaluations from 
the subjective point of view tend to be positively idealized. The advantage of this 
approach is that it also provides the basis for a distinction between AustenÕs or 
DickensÕ novels, ChaplinÕs films, much good religious or political art and egregiously 
sentimental works such as, say, the novels of Barbara Cartland, bad romantic 
comedies and Norman RockwellÕs Happy Birthday Miss Jones. Both classes of works 
solicit emotional responses and attitudes that are sentimental about love, children and 
so on. However, the first class of works, unlike the second class, also proffer up 
something like an external perspective from which audiences can see or be reminded 
that such first person idealized attitudes and responses are just that i.e. idealizations. 
There is a parallel between good sentimental art and the good sentimentalist as 
characterized above. 
 Both the options explored above have a lot going for them though they remain 
dissatisfying for the following reason: it is granted to the standard view that 
sentimentality is by its nature epistemically defective. Whilst the two different type of 
moves identify excusing or permissibility conditions that allow for a distinction 
between good and bad sentimentality, both moves remain open to the charge that to 
be guilty of sentimentality is to be in cognitive error. In the next section I will 
critically examine this central assumption. 
 
Sentimentality, Affective Attachments and Orientation 
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Standard cognitivists about emotions hold that they are essentially constituted, at least 
in part, as special types of judgements or evaluative thoughts (Solomon 1976; 
Nussbaum 1994). The condemnation of sentimentality presupposes cognitivism about 
emotions (see Jefferson 1983: 521 and 526Ð529). It is particularly noteworthy that 
Solomon (1976) is celebrated as a cognitivist about the emotions and yet attempts to 
defend certain aspects of sentimentality. It is hard to see how the two views are 
compatible (unless at least one of two options explored in the previous section are 
thought to do the job). Minimally, on standard cognitivist accounts, experiencing the 
emotion of joy or hope incorporates some propositional content as constituting its 
formal object to the effect that it has certain properties and these are to be evaluated 
as good. The trouble with someoneÕs sentimentality about a partner or children, say, is 
held to follow from the putative fact that the idealization contains falsely positive 
overall beliefs (including evaluative judgements) about them. 
 A different approach worth exploring is the idea that sentimentality is not 
always up for straightforward epistemic evaluation in such terms or, if it is, the 
evaluation should sometimes be in terms of partial rather than all things considered 
judgements or beliefs. Neo-Jamesians hold that emotions are more akin to 
noncognitive embodied affective appraisals (Damasio 1994; Prinz 2004; Robinson 
2007) with various possibilities in between (such as Greenspan 1988; Helm 2001; 
DÕArms and Jacobson 2000). Neo-Jamesians account for emotions as the somatic 
appraisal of something as, say, joyful or hopeful, which marks it out as something 
positively valenced in the relevant way and thereby gears us up for action. There is 
much disagreement amongst non-cognitivists about what constitutes appropriateness. 
According to some (Robinson 2007) appropriateness is a matter of cognitive states 
that typically arise from the emotional state. According to others (Prinz 2004) 
appropriateness is a complex relation to fittingness considered in more or less 
evolutionary terms. On a more cognitively sympathetic view emotions irreducibly 
involve appraisals embodied in feelings towards objects (Goldie 2000: 50Ð83; 2002) 
and are more akin to perceptual construals (Roberts 2003) though, crucially, feeling 
or emotion appearances do not automatically express overall judgements or 
evaluations. The point here is that if we think of some emotional states as either non-
cognitive affective appraisals, along with the neo-Jamesians, or as more akin to 
perceptual construals, along with the neo-cognitivists, then sentimentality Ð or what is 
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often identified on the standard view as sentimentality Ð may not be in the kind of 
epistemic error for which, on standard cognitivist accounts of the emotions, it is to be 
condemned. 
Rather than manifesting an overall belief or judgement that aims at knowledge 
(e.g., an accurate prediction or self ascription) sentimentality is often concerned with 
something else. In particular sentimentality is often concerned with vivifying, 
affirming, reinforcing or re-orientating our emotional perspective and attachments. 
Sentimentality, as a dispositional state, an occurent process or indeed as manifest in 
action, often cultivates or reinforces a sense of social or personal attachment. 
Sentimental gestures ranging from surprise gifts to declarations often express 
emotional hopes or attachments and in so doing can reaffirm or help to develop 
personal relationships. This is consistent with the possibility that such gifts or 
declarations can sometimes result in misunderstanding, mismatched expectations or 
even aversion (Belk and Coon 1991). It is far from always being the case that 
sentimental gestures are greeted warmly. Whether it be with respect to family, friends 
or hoped for romantic partners, most of us are familiar with tales of someoneÕs 
sentimental gesture being rebuffed rather than welcomed (in some cases all too 
predictably it has to be said). Nonetheless the point of sentimental gestures and 
responses is often to affirm or further emotional attachments. Hence there are many 
social conventions that systematically serve (or seek to exploit) our need to belong in 
terms of affirming or developing personal, group and institutional attachments. The 
conventions surrounding gift exchange on festival days, birthdays or ValentineÕs Day 
are but one example. Indeed in the romantic case there is a complex dance of 
individual negotiation around the set of social expectations and conventions 
governing the expression of sentimental attitudes as a relationship starts to develop. 
 Now sentimental gestures, in order to be effective, have to be presented as and 
taken to be authentic. This no doubt explains the aversion some have to certain 
conventions such as those bound up with ValentineÕs Day. The motivating thought is 
that sentimental expressions of love and care should be genuine and the normative 
expectations set up by the social convention casts doubt on the authenticity of the 
emotions expressed. In other words the conventional sentimentality may be performed 
as a duty and might thus be insincere, fake or manufactured. Note how the kind of 
objection to the social convention here is of a kind with the criticism we saw earlier of 
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sentimentality itself as somehow involving fake or manufactured emotion. Perhaps 
part of the reason this objection tends to arise in relation to ValentineÕs Day as 
opposed to the gift giving conventions bound up with, for example, birthdays, is 
because ValentineÕs Day is taken to be bound up with romantic feelings. Nonetheless 
notice that how someone meets or abrogates the conventions can itself be a mark of 
insincerity or authenticity. A ValentineÕs Day present of money, for example, would 
presumably not do the trick, and, somewhat stereotypically, someone farming the task 
out to a personal assistant is similarly underwhelming. By contrast the kind of 
personalized thought and effort that goes into meeting the convention clearly can 
betoken genuine love and attachment (as can the development of conventions fairly 
unique to the couple concerned such as always going to a gig on ValentineÕs Day as 
Ôtheir thingÕ). Social conventions can make expressions of affection easier to fake but 
the very existence of such conventions signals the underlying motivation to express 
and develop emotional attachments through sentimental actions and declarations. As 
should be clear this is not something particular to romantic relationships since this is 
just as true of familial relationships and friendships. 
 Simply being subject to or feeling sentimental toward someone or something, 
independently of expression in action, can cultivate or reinforce social attachments. 
Indulging in sentimental memories of loved ones, for example, can often remind one 
of, revivify or strengthen a sense of connection to and love for them. Furthermore in 
reminding us of or reinforcing such attachments sentimentality serves to remind us 
that we are or once were cared for. Thus sentimentality can help not merely to 
enhance our mood but help to ward off a sense of loneliness and isolation (as opposed 
to being solitary). 
 One way of bringing this out is to consider what happens both when 
developing relationships are going particularly well or going awry. In both cases 
people are often sentimental about how the relationship is or once was, as well as 
sentimental about relationships more generally. In doing so sentimentality, as an 
attitude in the service of emotional attachment, might concentrate attention upon good 
aspects of the relationship and even increase the ease with which positive memories 
are accessed (Baldwin et al 1996). If a particular relationship is in trouble this might 
prompt someone to become contrastingly more sentimental about previous 
relationships, indulge in sentimental imaginings about possible relationships or seek 
	 20	
out sentimental romantic fiction such as Pride and Prejudice or Bridget Jones. This 
seems to be a common enough phenomenon and is consistent with psychological 
research that suggests when the deterioration of relationships is salient people tend to 
focus attention on representations of deep or solid attachments (Knowles and Gardner 
2008). More generally, where individuals have a strongly salient need to belong or 
feel socially isolated they are often especially susceptible to sentimentality as 
manifested, for example, in nostalgia for the past (Loveland, Smeesters, and Mandel 
2010). 
 We are by nature social animals. In our emotional economy sentimentality 
often serves a need to establish and strengthen social or personal attachments. In so 
doing it can manifest a heartfelt care for others and remind someone that they too are 
or have been cared for. 
 Sentimentality may also serve to reinforce or develop our self-conceptions. 
Sentimental actions or attitudes often express and develop our sense of what is 
important to us ranging over our biography, aptitudes, projects and activities. Hearing 
a particular song may make provoke someoneÕs sentimental memories of a particular 
time and phase in their life. In general sentimental memories often concern events that 
were or are particularly meaningful for an individual and bound up with a sense of 
who they are or once were. There are complexities here. After all sentimental 
memories of oneÕs past self often serve to highlight discontinuities as much as 
continuities. A sentimental memory of oneÕs past self may be such partly in virtue of 
the identification with and sympathy for oneÕs past self as much as for its very 
foregrounding of significant differences in character, aspiration or outlook. 
Nonetheless sentimentality often serves to foreground and strengthen an individualÕs 
sense of what is important to them and makes them the kind of person she is (or was) 
thereby cultivating a sense of self-esteem or worth. 
 Sentimentality then is often directed toward manifesting or cultivating 
emotional attachments toward others, oneÕs self or indeed what is already cared about. 
In doing so it not only deepens relationships or a sense of what one cares about but 
facilitates social connectedness, positively valenced affective states or attitudes, 
mitigates against loneliness and reinforces self esteem. 
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 It is worth noting that the benefits of sentimentality as outlined might not 
always arise given that some individuals will be cynical about, aversive to or lack 
opportunities for personal intimacy. This may be due to a range of factors such as the 
presumption that people are untrustworthy, cannot be relied upon to be supportive or 
fear of rejection. In such cases sentimentality about past relationships, for example, 
may serve only to highlight and increase present loneliness and misery. Furthermore 
the extent to which individuals are subject to or susceptible to sentimentality will no 
doubt vary. Individuals who are more given to experiencing sentimentality might be 
or conceive of themselves as more emotional than others, have a greater need for 
social connectedness or need to experience personal relations as meaningful or 
constituting an achievement. 
 On this approach sentimentality is a disposition to feel warmly and think 
positively toward the objects of our affections. We are often motivated to be 
sentimental to reinforce our sense of social connectedness or our self-conceptions. 
Where sentimentality does so our sense of self-esteem, confidence and 
meaningfulness can be enhanced. No doubt people can tend to do so all too easily and 
self-indulgently, just as some people may tend not to do so enough. What is far from 
clear is that sentimentality as such is a bad thing. Indeed, when viewed from an 
emotional point of view, as contrasted with a strictly epistemic one, sentimentality is 
surely often a very good thing indeed. 
 
Educating the Heart and Sentimental Art 
What implications if any does this have for sentimental art? Sentimentality in art may 
be a good rather than bad making feature in virtue of reinforcing or bringing about 
sentimental attachments that enhance rather than undermine the workÕs value as art. 
This is of a piece with a more general line of thought I have argued for elsewhere that 
holds certain features that are often defects in art works, including emotional and 
moral aspects, can sometimes turn out to be a virtue in others (Kieran 2010). If 
sentimentality is taken to be something that is always in cognitive error then this 
looks like a difficult position to hold to, especially if it is in straightforward cognitive 
terms that one is prone to evaluate it. Thus, assuming one is prepared to grant that 
cognitive value can contribute to a workÕs value as art, sentimentality in a work may 
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be taken as an obvious defect. It is to misrepresent how the world is. However if we 
recognize that sentimentality is often a matter of manifesting, reinforcing or aligning 
emotions then what is often identified as sentimentality in art can often be a good 
thing. In other words either a) as with other aspects of our emotional engagement with 
art (Kieran 2010), sentimentality is not always bad and can sometimes be a good 
making feature or b) what is often identified as sentimentality is no such thing due to 
a category mistake born from an overly narrow cognitivist conception of emotion. 
Moreover, the point is not particular to art but holds with respect to what we might 
think of as rhetoric and indeed life more generally. 
 Consider in this light speeches made by figures as diverse as J. F. Kennedy, 
Martin Luther King and Barack Obama. Political speeches are often criticized for 
being self-serving or manufacturing false sentiment. Yet good speeches often put 
sympathy for personalized, innocent figures at their centre to engage our emotions 
and bring home the concrete, human significance of some event, oppression or cause. 
Consider CobbettÕs Parliamentary History report of William WilberforceÕs speech in 
favour of the abolition of slavery (see Carey 2003 for the insightful analysis to which 
the following is indebted). At one point in the speech Wilberforce examines evidence 
provided by Mr. Norris, a Liverpool slave trader, with an admixture of sensationalism 
and irony. Norris had claimed that Ôsong and dance are promotedÕ on the ships as if 
the slaves pursued some kind of enjoyable exercise on the voyage. Wilberforce 
exposes the use of ÔpromotedÕ as a euphemism showing that Ôthe truth is, that for the 
sake of exercise, these miserable wretches, loaded with chains, oppressed with disease 
and wretchedness, are forced to dance by the terror of the lash, and sometimes by the 
actual use of itÕ (Carey 2003: 290). What follows then is surely sentimental: 
 
As to their singing, what shall we say when we are told that their songs are songs of 
lamentation upon their departure which, while they sing, are always in tears 
insomuch, that one captain (more humane as I should conceive him, therefore, than 
the rest) threatened one of the women with a flogging, because the mournfulness of 
her song was too painful for his feelings (Carey 2003: 290). 
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 As Carey (2003: 290Ð1) points out, amongst other rhetorical devices being 
deployed here, the passage alludes to the BibleÕs Old Testament and specifically 
Psalm 137: 
 
By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept, 
when we remembered Zion. 
We hanged our harps upon the willows in the midst thereof, 
For there they that carried us away captive required of us a song; 
and they that wasted us required of us mirth, 
saying, ÔSing the songs of ZionÕ. 
How shall we sing the LordÕs song in a strange land? 
 
The biblical allusiveness both keys the audience in to the recognition that this 
part of WilberforceÕs speech is a sentimental parable and one which takes on many of 
the overtones of those depicted in Psalm 137. Hence the audience is solicited to 
respond with sentimentality and benevolence toward the slaves as innocent, God 
fearing and righteous amidst their suffering. Note also the rhetorical manner in which 
Wilberforce contrasts the audienceÕs implied solicited response to the false 
sentimentality manifested by the slave ship captain which is itself starkly contrasted 
with the genuine tears and lamentations of the slaves. The parable serves not only to 
distance the audience emotionally from the fake sentiments of the captain but to 
orientate and cultivate sympathy for the slaves in the audience (and flatter the 
audience since they may then derive pleasure in identifying the ironic comment on the 
ÔfeelingÕ captain). The audience is not just orientated toward and made sensitive to the 
suffering identified but the speech cultivates compassion for the oppressed. What is 
the purpose of Wilberforce doing this? He is aiming at orientating his audience 
emotionally so they will thus become more open to the argument due to follow this 
passage (for the abolition of slavery). The psychological orientation of the audienceÕs 
feelings and the compassion of genuine sentiment is what the speech evokes prior to 
	 24	
the detailing of the horrific mortality rates of slaves when on board ships, when 
waiting to be sold and during the seasoning period. What we see in WilberforceÕs 
speech is an extremely common and important feature of good rhetoric. It is not 
enough to identify or individualize suffering. Rather the audience must be moved by 
genuine warm emotions towards those oppressed and the concomitant compassion for 
their plight enables the significance of the argument to be taken to heart (in this case 
as a motive to act to abolish the slave trade). Indeed, in such cases the aim is to 
orientate and cultivate emotional attachment to those otherwise opposed or who have 
not considered slaves in such a light before. Thus sentimentality Ð or what would be 
identified as sentimentality by the received view Ð is a good making feature of the 
speech. 
 Rhetoric and art are often rather similar. What sometimes matters is that 
sentimentality brings about, reinforces or expands emotional attachments. Works 
often aim to move us sentimentally in order to serve the purposes of emotional 
solidarity or motivate care for certain types of people. Sentimentality can serve to 
bring others into the moral compass of care and concern where reason alone may be 
insufficient or at the very least less readily relied on. It is, after all, a common feature 
of religious, romantic, moral or political art that it sentimentalizes in this way, in 
order to reinforce or bring about emotional openness and attachment to those often 
unconsidered, subject to prejudice or badly treated. Classic literary examples includes 
the work of Harriet Beecher Stowe, Mark Twain and Charles Dickens. 
 To take just one case consider the initial and revised endings Dickens gave to 
Great Expectations. The original, unpublished ending has Pip accidentally bumping 
into a remarried Estella and then reflecting; 
 
ÔI was very glad afterwards to have had the interview; for, in her face, and in her 
voice, and in her touch, she gave me the assurance, that suffering had been stronger 
than Miss Havisham's teaching, and had given her a heart to understand what my 
heart used to be.Õ (2000: 401) 
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 Dickens subsequently revised the place of their meeting to Miss HavershamÕs 
old estate with Estelle still widowed and, finally; 
 
ÔI took her hand in mine, and we went out of the ruined place; and, as the morning 
mists had risen long ago when I first left the forge, so the evening mists were rising 
now, and in all the broad expanse of tranquil light they showed to me, I saw no 
shadow of another parting from her.Õ (2000: 399) 
 
 The revised ending is much more sentimental in promising the prospect of the 
yearned, hoped for ending with Pip and Stella wondering into the future together 
(albeit under a shadow cast by what has gone before). Yet the sentimentality of the 
revised ending makes for a better completion of the work. Great Expectations is all 
the greater for it. 
Even Norman Rockwell had his moments. His The Problem We All Live With 
(1964), part of the Norman Rockwell Museum collections, visually alludes to famous 
news photographs from the previous year. Ruby Bridges had been escorted by U.S. 
Marshalls as the first black child to attend an all white school in the south of the USA 
at the time of the civil rights movement. RockwellÕs painting is far from identical to 
the photographs and relevant differences include artistic devices designed to enhance 
sentimental orientation and attachment. Amongst other features the picture plane cuts 
off the deputies in RockwellÕs painting so the adult figures are faceless. The white 
male, suited figures almost seem to be marching the black child along, giving a 
martial air to the procession so that the adults are both ambiguously protective and 
threatening. The yellow armbands worn by the suited figures reinforce this 
impression. The suits themselves provide a contrast with the brilliant white of the 
black childÕs dress, socks and shoes which is itself reinforced by the contrast against 
the childÕs dark skin. Visual symbolization of her innocence is further reinforced by 
the school textbooks and ruler held in her left hand. Against the wall behind them we 
see the splattered remains of a hurled tomato and much of the word ÔniggerÕ scrawled 
across it. The fact that the only full figure and face we see is the little girlÕs, plus the 
very tight picture plane which gives the viewer a sense of being right up close 
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magnifies the dramatic, emotional impact of the painting. Here we have a Rockwell 
painting that solicits sentimentality as a means of reinforcing or bringing about 
psychological orientation. The painting solicits sentimental attachment to the 
individualized, innocent child and, in doing so, to those more generally fighting for 
their civil rights. This is hardly an exception. In fact many great works of popular art 
are artfully sentimental in ways that affirm or seek to re-orientate emotional 
attachments. In some cases, as with Great Expectations, the sentimentality will be 
directed toward more individual hopes, aspirations and ideals (such as romantic love). 
In other cases, as with the Wilberforce speech or The Problem We All Live With, the 
sentimentality will be directed toward social causes. Hence, as Carroll (2013) shows 
in some detail, works such as Uncle TomÕs Cabin and Philadelphia bring artistic 
resources to bear in structuring the emotional engagement of their contemporary 
audiences in order to effect a social change in moral attitudes. 
It is important to note that my argument allows for a principled distinction 
between fantastical sentimentality and sentimentality which is an appropriate 
expression of sentimental attachment. Fantastical sentimentality of this kind involves 
indulging the emotion or attachment in WildeÕs sense i.e. as an untroubled emotional 
free rider. The emotional attachment or ideal expressed is not earned. In the cognitive 
case the fundamental error is one of belief. In the non-cognitive attachment case the 
fundamental error is in terms of what has or has not been done to earn the right to 
express emotional tenderness or attachment. Whether someoneÕs expression of 
emotional attachment to an ideal is genuine or justified will depend at least partly 
upon the history of a relationship, say, what the sentimental person has done and is 
disposed to do (especially in the face of difficulties). This is true of sentimentality in 
both life and art. 
Bad sentimental art (in the non-cognitive attachment sense) refuses to face up 
to potential difficulties. Thus Mendelsohn characterizes Alice SeboldÕs The Lovely 
Bones along the following lines. The novel starts with the brutal rape and murder of a 
teenage girl, and proceeds to follow the characters left behind as she looks down from 
some kind of heavenly limbo. Whilst the novelÕs opening suggests uncomfortable 
honesty about the darker side of humanity, Ôdarkness, grief and heartbreak are what 
The Lovely Bones scrupulously avoids. This is the real heart of its appealÕ 
(Mendelsohn 2008: 5). Why? Since Ôinstead of making you confront dreadful things, 
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SeboldÕs novel, if anything, keeps assuring you that those things have no really 
permanent consequences Ð apart from the feel good emotional redemptionsÕ 
(Mendelsohn 2008: 8). Superficially the novel takes on difficult issues whilst 
nonetheless showing emotional attachment and loves as all too easy, thereby allowing 
the reader to indulge unearned positive emotions. Good sentimental art, by way of 
contrast, recognizes the difficulties and thereby earns the right to express the ideals 
and attachments of the heart. It is not that good sentimental art does not traffic in 
idealizations or unlikely happy endings. However, good sentimental art is at least 
prescient of emotional difficulties, makes us aware of them and, in that light, affirms 
or reorientates our attachments. This is what we see in much religious art, good 
romance novels, AustenÕs novels, much of Dickens, ChaplinÕs City Lights, 
RockwellÕs The Problem, the television series The West Wing and many more works. 
Good sentimental art does so in ways that affirms or re-orientates our affections for 
the better thereby rendering such works valuable as art.
1
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